In history guerrilla warfare always played an important role whether it was of a large scale or of a limited character fighting. Grenkevich traces its impact on military history in the 18th and 19th century in Europe and North America. He carefully analyses the Russian partisan movement from the first bloody encounters in the 1870s, taking into account the social, economic and political configurations of Russia. The work details how the Communist Party studied the Red guerrillas' fighting experience at the end of 1918 and included in the Red Army's Field Manual a special chapter named 'Partisan Operations'. During the Second World War the most significant partisan war took place. The relationship between the Party, the Red Army and the Partisan Movements is covered in the main body of Grenkevich's historical research. This study is a response to the lack of a comprehensive bibliography and reliable books on the Partisan Movement. In preparing this research the author conducted interviews with surviving partisans; in addition, a significant amount of new Russian information on the activity of the Soviet partisans has become available in recent years.

In history guerrilla warfare always played an important role whether it was of a large scale or of a limited character fighting. Grenkevich traces its impact on military history in the 18th and 19th century in Europe and North America. He carefully analyses the Russian partisan movement from the first bloody encounters in the 1870s, taking into account the social, economic and political configurations of Russia. The work details how the Communist Party studied the Red guerrillas' fighting experience at the end of 1918 and included in the Red Army's Field Manual a special chapter named 'Partisan Operations'. During the Second World War the most significant partisan war took place. The relationship between the Party, the Red Army and the Partisan Movements is covered in the main body of Grenkevich's historical research. This study is a response to the lack of a comprehensive bibliography and reliable books on the Partisan Movement. In preparing this research the author conducted interviews with surviving partisans; in addition, a significant amount of new Russian information on the activity of the Soviet partisans has become available in recent years.

This volume begins with an investigation of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It draws upon eye-witness German accounts of what occurred, and supplements these with German archival and detailed Soviet materials. The Soviet government has released extensive amounts of formerly classified archival materials from the period. This material has been incorporated into the maps and text.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations", "deep battle", and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

This volume begins with an investigation of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It draws upon eye-witness German accounts of what occurred, and supplements these with German archival and detailed Soviet materials. The Soviet government has released extensive amounts of formerly classified archival materials from the period. This material has been incorporated into the maps and text.

This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

The Soviet Study of War" series examines the lessons Soviet military theorists and commanders learned from the study of their own military experience. These are translations of Soviet documents.

The Soviet Study of War" series examines the lessons Soviet military theorists and commanders learned from the study of their own military experience. These are translations of Soviet documents.

A comprehensive guide to the battle for the Ukraine from the Soviet perspective during the winter of 1943-1944. This volume is an unexpurgated translation of the originally classified Soviet General Staff Study No.14.

First published in 2006. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This new book is a chronological narrative of the experiences of Evgenii Moniushko, who lived through and survived the first year of the siege of Leningrad and who served as a junior officer in the Red Army during the last eighteen months of war and the first year of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

This volume presents an intensely human view of daily army life both in combat and garrison duty and unique perspectives on the conditions he and other junior officers and common soldiers endured while in army service.

This new book is a chronological narrative of the experiences of Evgenii Moniushko, who lived through and survived the first year of the siege of Leningrad and who served as a junior officer in the Red Army during the last eighteen months of war and the first year of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

This volume presents an intensely human view of daily army life both in combat and garrison duty and unique perspectives on the conditions he and other junior officers and common soldiers endured while in army service.

Armed revolution and civil war gave birth to the Soviet Union, world War II propelled it to global pre-eminence, and the Cold War contributed to the Soviet Union's demise. Given Marxism-Leninism's idological preoccupation with war and threats of war, it is understandable that the spectre of war should play a vital role in the life and fate of the Soviet state. This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the twin pillars of Soviet political-military actions and Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It aims to be not simply a retrospective account of what was, but to form part of the context for what will be in the future.

This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Prepared by the Red Army General Staff in 1944 from combat reports and other top-secret archive materials, the work is a practical and candid document, which was written to educate the Red Army in the intricacies, demands and pitfalls of modern mobile warefare.

This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Prepared by the Red Army General Staff in 1944 from combat reports and other top-secret archive materials, the work is a practical and candid document, which was written to educate the Red Army in the intricacies, demands and pitfalls of modern mobile warefare.

No war has caused greater human suffering than the Second World War on Germany's Eastern Front. Victory in the war cost the Red Army over 29 million casualties, whose collective fate is only now being properly documented. Among the many millions of soldiers who made up that gruesome toll were an unprecedented number of Red Army general officers. Many of these perished on the battlefield or in prison camps at the hands of their German tormentors. Others fell victim to equally terrifying Stalinist repression. Together these generals personify the faceless nature of the war of the Eastern Front - the legions of forgotten souls who perished in the war. Covered up for decades, the saga of these victims of war can now be told and in this volume, A A Maslov begins the difficult process of memorializing these warrior casualties. Using formerly secret Soviet archival materials and personal interviews with the families of the officers, he painstakingly documents the fate of Red Army generals who fell victim to wartime enemy action.

No war has caused greater human suffering than the Second World War on Germany's Eastern Front. Victory in the war cost the Red Army over 29 million casualties, whose collective fate is only now being properly documented. Among the many millions of soldiers who made up that gruesome toll were an unprecedented number of Red Army general officers. Many of these perished on the battlefield or in prison camps at the hands of their German tormentors. Others fell victim to equally terrifying Stalinist repression. Together these generals personify the faceless nature of the war of the Eastern Front - the legions of forgotten souls who perished in the war. Covered up for decades, the saga of these victims of war can now be told and in this volume, A A Maslov begins the difficult process of memorializing these warrior casualties. Using formerly secret Soviet archival materials and personal interviews with the families of the officers, he painstakingly documents the fate of Red Army generals who fell victim to wartime enemy action.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations," "deep battle," and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

For almost 70 years Soviet and Russian military theorists have been fascinated with the concept of airborne operations. Now Russian theorists tackle the problems posed to such operations by high-precision weaponry. This work, using newly released and formerly classified Soviet and East German archives, provides a detailed record of the performance of Soviet airborne forces during peace and war.

For almost 70 years Soviet and Russian military theorists have been fascinated with the concept of airborne operations. Now Russian theorists tackle the problems posed to such operations by high-precision weaponry. This work, using newly released and formerly classified Soviet and East German archives, provides a detailed record of the performance of Soviet airborne forces during peace and war.

The Soviet Study of War" series examines the lessons Soviet military theorists and commanders learned from the study of their own military experience. These are translations of Soviet documents.

In mid-December 1942, after encircling the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Soviet forces in southern Russia began a series of offensive operations which continued unabated into February 1943. In these offensives the Soviet High Command attempted to smash German resistance and encircle the bulk of two German army groups. For two months the German forces struck back. In a well co-ordinated counterstroke they inflicted a major operational defeat on the Soviets and stabilized the front until the summer.

In mid-December 1942, after encircling the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Soviet forces in southern Russia began a series of offensive operations which continued unabated into February 1943. In these offensives the Soviet High Command attempted to smash German resistance and encircle the bulk of two German army groups. For two months the German forces struck back. In a well co-ordinated counterstroke they inflicted a major operational defeat on the Soviets and stabilized the front until the summer.